International Law and Courts
Invited to revise and resubmit at International Studies Quarterly.
Authors: Kelebogile Zvobgo, Wayne Sandholtz, and Suzie Mulesky
2019 Best Paper Award, Human Rights Section, American Political Science Association
International relations scholarship has made significant strides in explaining how states design treaty obligations and why they accept treaty commitments. However, far less attention has been paid to factors that may influence states’ modification of their treaty obligations via reservations. We theorize that states will be more likely to enter reservations when treaty obligations and domestic institutions increase compliance costs and policy adjustment costs. More specifically, we expect that (1) demanding provisions, i.e., provisions that create strong, precise obligations requiring domestic action, and (2) demanding domestic institutions, such as judicial independence, will enhance the likelihood of reservation. To test our theory, we exploit an original dataset that codes reservations at the provision (treaty-article-paragraph) level for the ten core international human rights treaties. Consistent with our expectations, we find that states are more likely to enter reservations on more demanding treaty provisions. However, we do not find a consistent relationship between demanding domestic institutions and reservations. Reservations do not appear to be driven purely by state-level characteristics as previous scholarship suggests. Our findings indicate that states weigh individual treaty obligations and calibrate their commitments accordingly.
Authors: Suzie Mulesky, Wayne Sandholtz, and Kelebogile Zvobgo
Why do some human rights treaties receive rapid and near universal commitment from states while others take decades for the majority of states to ratify? We analyze new data that code every provision of ten global human rights treaties for the strength and precision of the obligations they contain. We classify obligations that are strong, precise, and that require domestic action as “demanding.” We hypothesize that treaties containing more of these demanding obligations would be seen as more costly to ratify because they imply potentially greater policy adaptation or compliance costs. Event history analyses are consistent with that hypothesis. The addition of 15 demanding treaty obligations decreases the likelihood of ratification by over 20 percent, similar to the effect of moving from democracy to autocracy. This effect is consistent when controlling for various treaty, state, and global level factors that may also influence a state’s decision to ratify.
Authors: Kelebogile Zvobgo and Stephen Chaudoin
A growing regime complex of domestic and international legal institutions have overlapping jurisdictions for violations of international law. In many contexts, the jurisdiction of the international court is restricted by the principle of "complementarity": the international court can only intervene in countries where governments have proved unwilling or unable to conduct investigations or plaintiffs have exhausted domestic remedies. We ask whether complementarity (a) increases support for international courts’ actions and (b) increases support for domestic remedies as a way to forestall international court action. International courts, especially the International Criminal Court, rely heavily on an affirmative answer to both questions. We assess these predictions with a survey experiment about the ICC in the Republic of Georgia and with qualitative data from interviews with Georgian civil society actors and policy makers. We do not find that this framing improves support for ICC or domestic court actions. These results are important because they indicate that arguments about complementarity are unlikely to stem the tide of increasingly negative public opinion against international courts and international organizations, more generally.